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1. Introduction
It is easily understood that when the number of customers to a sector
of service industry decreases, the profits of the sector will in general also
decrease, but this at a greater rate than that of the customers. This is
because of fixed cost. Hence we will observe a severer effect on tax
revenue.
Suppose, however, that in this service sector there are two types of
shops, each offering distinct services at differential prices with fixed cost
possibly being also unequal. And imagine the decrease of customers is
experienced by one of these two types, not both. Then having less profits,
those shops belonging to the damaged type may try, if feasible, to shift to
the other type, thus alleviating losses on the whole. This can also mitigate
the effect on tax revenue.
The authors have in mind the case ofpubs and restaurants where two
types are the 'first-rate (more expensive with more services)' and the
'popular' class. And in the days of recession, people tend to choose those
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from the latter, and less customers to gorgeous pubs.
In this note we present a simple model of a sector comprising two
types of shops, and conduct an elementary comparative statics analysis.
Most results are natural consequences, which can be inferred without
using equations. And yet we supply proofs based upon equations and
inequalities, which would hopefully be useful to students dealing with
more complicated models.
2. Model
In our model sector, there exist two groups of shops called type A and
B. Let us first write down their total group profits:
7rA = (PA - V)QA -lANA, (1)
7rB = (PB - v)(Q - QA) - IB (N - NA) . (2)
Here notation is as follows:
7r; : total group profits of type i (i = A, B),
Pi : price offered by type i (i = A ,B),
/; : fixed cost per shop belonging to type i (i = A ,B),
v : cost per customer common to both types,
Qi : number of customers to type i(i = A ,B),
Q : total number of customers to the sector Q = QA + QB,
Ni : number of shops belonging to i (i = A ,B),
N : total number of shops in the sector, N = NA + NB.
We assume that PA > PB > v and IA > IB' and first suppose that PA, PB, lA,
IB' QA, QB, v, and N are all positive constants, and determine NA using
the following equilibrium relation.
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(3)1I"A 1I"B-----
NA N -NA
Eq. (3) simply requires that the average profits per shop are equal in both
types. Substituting eqs. (1) and (2) into (3), we have
F(NA) == lfA - fB)Nl-lfAN - fBN + (PB - v)Q + (PA - PB)QA)NA
+(PA -v)QAN =0
This quadratic equation has a positive solution in the open interval (0, N).
This can be verified because F (N) = - (PB - V )QB N , that is, negative.
3. Stability ofEquilibrium
Let us formulate the adjustment equation in terms of a difference
equation as
where s is a given positive constant expressing the speed of adjustment. A
sufficient condition for local stability is
-I {I _ . ((PA -V)QA (PB -v)(Q -QA))} 1
< s Nl + (N - NA)2 <,
where NA is the equilibrium value. This condition is clearly satisfied when
the speed of adjustment s is small enough, and in fact gives a global
stability because of the uniqueness of equilibrium, provided Q; IN; is
bounded on and near the boundary (Fujimoto (1986)).
The variable N A should take on only integer values, but the stability
property will not be affected in a destructive way even if a certain
mechanism is introduced to guarantee NA be always an integer. In a
higher dimension this may present an interesting problem.
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4. Comparative Statics
Now suppose one of the parameters, QA, is increased. By a simple
reasoning, we know NA will also go up. This can be confirmed because
dNA 8F 18QA
-=-
dQA 8F 18NA
- (PA - PB)NA + (PA - v)N
(4)
In deriving this inequality, we assume that 'll"A > 0 and 'll"B > 0 at the
equilibrium. On the QA - NA plane, NA is an increasing function of QA , and
is denoted as NA(QA)'
Next we increase Q. Keeping QA fixed, i. e., increasing QB only, we
obtain
dNA = _ 8F 18Q = _ - (PB - v)NA < o.
dQ 8F 18NA negative value
Looked from another angle, this tells us that the function NA(QA) shifts
downward when Q increases.
Then, N is increased. We have
1 > dNA = _ {(PA - V)QA - fANA} +fBNA > o.
dN negative value
The left-hand inequality follows because - 8F 18NA consists of three
positive terms (see the above eq. (4» which subsume the numerator as a
proper subset. Therefore, when N increases, both NA and NB will expand.
This tells us that the function NA(QA ) shifts upward when N increases.
The effect on the average profits per shop can be examined as follows.
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d(7TA!NA) (PA -v)QA(-dNA!dN) D( . h fi d)-----'-..:..:..:....~ = 2 < WIt QA xe .
dN NA
When the number of customers for type A is kept constant, the increase of
total number of customers raises the average profits per shop of type A
because the number of shops of type A shrinks, while the increase of total
number ofshops will lower the average profits per shop because the shops
belonging to each type will also increase.
5. Effect on Profits
While NA is unchanged, the elasticity of 'irA with respect to QA is
QA d'lrA (PA - V)QA I
7TA • dQA = (PA - V)QA - fANA > ,
and so the effect is enlarged on account of the existence of fixed cost. In
our model, however, shops migrate to another group looking for higher
profits, and thus making NA greater. Now the elasticity becomes
QA . d'lrA = (PA - V)QA -fA QA (dNA!dQA) < (» I if QA . dNA > «)I
7TA dQA (PA -V)QA -fANA - NA dQA -,
that is, if the elasticity of NA with respect to QA is greater than unity, the
elasticity of 'irA with respect to QA is smaller than unity. (We may here
assume that the numerator remains positive.) Whatever is the size of the
elasticity, it can be shown that
QA d'lrA I QA d'lrA
'irA • dQA NA =con.<' > 'irA • dQA .
This is a partial story as we neglect the profits by those shops of type B :
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when QA and NA get larger, QB and NB become less. Hence let us check the
sectoral total profits. With NA unchanged,
QA . d("lrA +"lrB) = CpA - V)QA - CpB - V)QA = CpA - PB)QA > o.
~+~ d0 ~+~ ~+~
When migration between groups is allowed, we get
QA d("lrA +"lrB) CpA -PB)QA -(fA -!B)QA(dNA/dQA)
---.
~+~ d0 ~+~
Again it follows
QA .d("lrA+"lrB)1 > QA .d("lrA+"lrB)
"irA +"lrB dQA NA =consf "irA +"lrB dQA .
This inequality asserts that when the customers shift from A group to B
group, the size of decrease in the sectoral profits IS smaller when
migration is possible than when it is not. Hence the tax revenue has less
effect with shiftability between two types.
So far, we have considered the case in which QA changes while Q is
kept constant. Let us now examine the case where Q changes with QA
fixed. In a similar manner we can obtain, with no migration,
Q . d("lrA +"lrB) = CpB -v)Q > 0,
"irA +"lrB dQ "irA +"lrB
while we have, with migration allowed,
Q d("lrA +"lrB)
---.
"irA +"lrB dQ
In this case,
Q d("lrA+"lrB)1 Q d("lrA+"lrB)
"irA + "lrB . dQ NA =consf <"irA +"lrB' dQ .
If people move out of the shops of popular class and do not return to the
sector, the shiftability of shops between two classes exacerbates the
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situation for the inland tax revenue.
When we are to consider hard times of slump, customers are likely to
leave the shops belonging to the 'gorgeous' class rather than the popular
class, and so we had better take up the case where QA decreases while QB
remains unchanged. This is symmetrical to the case considered just in the
above. All we have to do is to assume fA < Is instead of fA > iB' Therefore
the result is
Q .d(1TA+1TB)\ > Q .d(1TA+7rB)
7rA + 7rB dQ NA =const 7rA + 7rB dQ
Thanks to shiftability, the effect on tax revenue is milder when some
people stop using the first-rate shops in recession.
6. Remarks
We have considered a simple model of a service sector in which there
are two groups of firms with different revenue and cost structures. It is
assumed that a firm or a shop can shift from one group to the other
without any cost. This implies a shop does not need much space to render
its services, and the contents of services do not require much fixed
equipment. This is the case with pubs. And the two groups are the 'first-
rate' class and the 'popular' class.
Our main result is that by shiftability between two groups, the sector
may incur less loss against the decrease in customers, especially that in
the first-rate class. This means the effect on tax revenue is also milder
with shiftability.
Our model in this note is quite restrictive because the size of
customers is exogenously given and does not respond to price
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differentials. Moreover in the analysis of comparative statics, the number
of shops is fixed with no entry and no bankruptcy. These constraints
should be removed in a more general framework.
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In this note we consider a simple model of a service sector. In this
service sector there are two types of shops, each offering distinct services
at differential prices with fixed cost possibly being also unequal. When
the decrease of customers is experienced by one of these two types, not
both, then having less profits, those shops belonging to the damaged type
can shift to the other type, thus alleviating losses on the whole. This can
also mitigate the effect on tax revenue.
The typical sector which the authors have in mind is that of pubs and
restaurants where two types are the 'first-rate (more expensive with more
services)' and the 'popular' class.
Based on this model, we conduct an elementary comparative statics
analysis. Most results are natural consequences, which can be inferred
without using equations. And yet we supply proofs based upon equations
and inequalities.
Our main result is that with migration between two groups, the
sector may incur less loss against the decrease in customers, especially
that in the first-rate class. This means the effect on tax revenue is also
milder with shiftability.
Our model in this note is quite restrictive because the size of
customers is exogenously given and does not respond to price
differentials. Moreover in the analysis of comparative statics, the number
of shops is fixed with no entry and no bankruptcy. These constraints
should be removed in a more general framework.
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